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Outside	the	Single	Market,	what	kind	of	deal	can
Britain’s	services	sector	hope	for?
Professional	and	business	services	account	for	more	than	a	tenth	of	the	UK
economy.	Leaving	the	single	market	means	it	will	no	longer	enjoy	the
passporting	rights	that	give	the	financial	sector	smooth	access	to	EU
markets.	John	Catalfamo	and	Laura	Arts	(LSE)	look	at	the	limited	options
available	to	Theresa	May	as	she	tries	to	reconcile	Brexiters’	demands	for
regulatory	autonomy	with	the	need	to	negotiate	access	to	the	Single	Market.
One	of	the	most	economically	significant	and	complex	aspects	of	the	post-Brexit	EU-UK	free	trade	agreement	(FTA)
negotiations	is	that	of	services.	While	negotiations	over	trade	in	goods	can	vary	in	complexity	from	simple	tariff	rates
to	full	regulatory	convergence,	services	negotiations	are	invariably	complicated,	requiring	sector-by-sector
negotiations	over	the	specific	“behind	the	border”	regulations	and	requirements	that	affect	the	provision	of	services.
The	future	of	EU-UK	trade	in	services	is	not	only	an	intricate	endeavour,	but	cuts	to	the	heart	of	one	of	the	central
political	issues	of	the	Brexit	referendum	and	the	debate	currently	happening	inside	Theresa	May’s	government:	how
much	regulatory	autonomy	should	the	UK	be	willing	to	defer	to	the	EU	in	return	for	market	access	to	the	European
Single	Market?
Services	in	the	UK	economy	and	in	EU-UK	trade
As	a	services-oriented	economy,	the	UK	runs	a	large	trade	surplus	in	services	with	the	rest	of	the	world	(4.7%	of
GDP	in	2016).	With	financial	services,	the	country	is	the	world’s	leading	financial	exporter	in	terms	of	net	flows,	with
$95bn	in	financial	exports	in	2014	and	UK	financial	institutions	can	currently	do	business	elsewhere	in	the	EU	without
setting	up	a	subsidiary	by	way	of	EU	“passporting	rights”	that	give	them	access	to	EU	markets.	Over	5,400	British
firms	rely	on	passporting	rights	to	bring	in	£9bn	in	revenue	every	year.
Lunch	hour	in	London	SE1,	2014.	Photo:	Henry	Hemming	via	a	CC	BY	2.0	licence
The	professional	and	business	services	(PBS)	sector	is	another	major	part	of	the	UK	services	sector.	It	accounts	for
over	11%	of	the	British	economy,	employing	almost	four	million	people,	and	36	of	the	top	50	UK	law	firms	have
offices	in	25	of	the	27	EU	Member	States.	In	2015,	over	£20bn	(32%)	of	the	UK’s	PBS	exports	went	to	the	EU,	and	it
imported	over	£15bn.	Given	the	size	of	these	cross-border	flows,	access	to	both	the	EU	and	third	markets	for
services	is	critical	for	the	British	economy.
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Services	and	the	Single	Market
The	intra-EU	provision	of	services	is	a	critical	component	of	the	Single	Market	(SM).	Given	that	the	EU	and	its	SM	is
as	much	a	political	project	as	an	economic	one,	and	that	part	of	its	resilience	is	the	preservation	of	benefits	for	its
members,	the	EU	has	established	that	it	will	not	let	the	UK	“cherry	pick”	the	parts	of	the	SM	to	which	it	wants	access,
and	those	from	which	it	will	diverge.	At	the	same	time,	Theresa	May	announced	in	January	2017	that	the	UK	would
leave	the	SM,	ensuring	a	“clean”	Brexit,	while	maintaining	the	“freest	possible	trade”	with	EU	countries.
Given	the	logic	of	a	single	regional	hub	for	most	of	Europe’s	financial	transactions,	financial	services	and	PBS
providers	in	both	the	EU	and	the	UK	stand	to	lose	significantly	if	the	UK’s	access	to	the	EU	markets	is	revoked	or
obstructed,	as	this	would	lead	to	substantial	transaction	costs	and	other	inefficiencies.
For	the	European	financial	system,	retail	banking	is	less	likely	to	be	affected	by	Brexit	than	wholesale	banking,	as	it
is	less	cross-border	in	nature.	Within	wholesale	banking,	over	the	counter	(OTC)	products	and	corporate	lending	and
deposits	are	most	likely	to	be	affected,	as	they	depend	on	recognition	of	equivalence	under	MiFID	II	or	access	to
single	passporting	rights.	Other	products	–	such	as	payments,	advisory	services,	and	exchange	traded	products	–
are	less	vulnerable.
The	key	tension	May’s	government	must	balance	is	between	regulatory	autonomy	and	market	access.	On	one	side
of	the	debate	are	those	who	benefit	greatly	from	market	access	to	the	services	SM.	On	the	other	side	are	the	“hard”
Brexit	supporters	who	emphasise	the	importance	of	British	regulatory	autonomy	and	trade	negotiation	authority.	Yet
these	two	options	are	mutually	exclusive.	Full	access	to	the	SM	necessitates	a	degree	of	regulatory	convergence.
Likewise,	prioritising	regulatory	autonomy	would	mean	foregoing	the	single	market	in	services.
Possible	post-Brexit	frameworks
For	financial	services	and	PBS,	the	UK’s	future	trade	relationship	with	the	EU	depends	on	whether	it	will	remain	in
the	SM	or	not.	If	it	decides	to	leave,	it	will	have	potential	options.	It	can	either	secure	a	mutual	recognition	agreement
with	the	EU,	in	which	specific	services	sectors	would	be	reviewed	by	a	committee	set	up	through	the	agreement	to
determine	the	commonalities	of	the	parties’	regulatory	regimes.	Another	option	is	equivalence,	which	is	a	unilateral
determination	by	the	EU	that	a	third	party’s	regulatory	regime	is	equivalent	to	EU	regulations.	The	EU	retains	the
authority	to	revoke	equivalence	at	its	own	discretion	with	only	30	days’	notice.	If	the	EU	and	UK	fail	to	reach	any	sort
of	agreement	for	services,	trade	in	services	would	revert	to	WTO	rules,	in	which	the	UK’s	access	to	the	single	market
would	be	that	of	any	other	third	(non-EU)	country	that	does	not	have	a	free	trade	agreement	with	the	EU	that	covers
services.
WTO	rules
An	outcome	in	which	WTO	rules	dictate	the	EU-UK	trade	relationship	would	be	the	most	extreme	example	of
regulatory	autonomy	with	limited	market	access.	The	UK	would	be	completely	unburdened	from	the	EU’s	regulatory
authority,	but	it	would	lack	any	preferred	access	to	the	SM.	No	major	stakeholder	has	advocated	this	position.
CETA
The	Comprehensive	Economic	and	Trade	Agreement	(CETA)	substantially	integrated	the	Canadian	and	EU	markets,
but	it	would	represent	a	significant	downgrading	from	the	access	that	the	UK	currently	enjoys.	While	CETA
liberalised	some	trade	in	services,	it	contained	a	wide	array	of	carve-outs	and	exceptions,	and	while	the	UK	could
potentially	trade	in	PBS	under	the	auspices	of	equivalence,	the	Commission	could	rescind	equivalence	at	its	own
discretion.	For	financial	services,	a	CETA-style	agreement	would	not	give	the	UK	single	passporting	rights	–	meaning
that	it	would	lose	its	ability	to	do	business	in	all	EU	member	states	without	establishing	subsidiaries	or	proving
equivalence.
CETA+
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A	CETA+	agreement	would	likely	fall	somewhere	between	EEA	membership	and	a	CETA-style	agreement.	The	‘plus’
could	imply	improved	coverage	of	services,	particularly	financial	services.	Under	such	an	agreement,	the	UK	could
try	to	secure	mutual	recognition	that	covered	professional	qualifications	and	licensing	for	various	sectors	from	its
inception.	But	any	deepening	of	services	commitments	under	a	CETA-Plus	agreement	would	trigger	unconditional
Most	Favoured	Nation	(MFN)	clauses	in	the	EU’s	other	FTAs	covering	the	market	access	aspects	of	cross	border
services	and	investment	(such	as	CETA).	However,	this	unconditional	MFN	may	not	apply	to	any	EU-UK	mutual
recognition	agreements.
Customs	Union	membership
Customs	union	membership	has	been	discussed	as	a	post-Brexit	option	for	goods,	but	without	an	FTA	covering
services	it	would	revert	trade	in	services	to	WTO	rules.	The	customs	union	provides	for	a	common	external	tariff	and
no	internal	barriers	to	trade	in	goods,	but	nothing	for	services.	Given	how	important	PBS	and	financial	services	are	to
the	British	economy,	UK	negotiators	are	unlikely	to	favour	this	option.
EU	Association	Agreement
The	association	agreement	between	the	EU	and	post-communist	Eastern	European	countries	like	Ukraine	offers	the
latter	an	opportunity	to	begin	the	regulatory	convergence	process	with	the	EU,	as	the	first	steps	to	membership.	As
such,	the	nature	of	the	EU-UK	relationship	is	fundamentally	different:	while	an	association	agreement	aims	towards
regulatory	convergence,	the	UK	aims	for	managed	divergence	away	from	EU	regulations.	However,	unlike	European
Economic	Area	(EEA)	membership,	an	association	agreement	not	only	demands	applying	EU	rules,	but	also
depends	on	the	EU	granting	equivalence	for	them.	In	addition,	the	party	must	agree	to	adopt	any	future	SM	services
regulations	immediately	–	which	would	likely	defer	more	regulatory	power	to	the	EU	than	the	hard	Brexit	supporters
could	stomach.
EEA	membership
An	EEA	agreement	would	be	the	most	minimal	shift	from	the	UK’s	current	position	as	a	member	of	the	EU,	and	it	is
the	framework	under	which	Norway,	Liechtenstein	and	Iceland	operate.	EEA	countries	have	access	to	the	SM	for
services	but	are	outside	the	customs	union	and	have	the	opportunity	to	negotiate	their	own	FTAs.	However,	these
countries	must	adopt	all	SM	regulations	into	their	national	laws	and	are	not	given	a	seat	at	the	table	when	the
regulations	are	devised,	acting	as	‘rule	takers’	rather	than	‘rule	makers.’	May’s	January	2017	speech	probably	ruled
out	EEA	membership	for	the	UK,	as	it	clashes	with	her	aim	of	a	“clean”	Brexit.
Conclusion
Options	like	EEA	membership,	WTO	rules,	and	standalone	customs	union	membership	are	unlikely	to	garner	much
support	from	relevant	stakeholders.	Either	they	give	too	little	market	access	for	services	(WTO	rules	or	a	customs
union)	or	they	defer	too	much	regulatory	authority	to	the	EU	(EEA	membership).	A	CETA,	CETA+,	or	an	association
agreement	might	placate	the	different	factions	within	the	UK	while	offering	a	palatable	option	for	the	EU.	However,
MFN	clauses	in	the	EU’s	existing	FTAs	mean	that	concessions	to	the	UK	would	translate	into	matching	concessions
to	all	the	EU’s	FTA	partners.	While	both	sides	are	now	seriously	considering	the	merits	of	CETA	or	CETA+,
equivalence	and	mutual	recognition	are	still	major	stumbling	blocks.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
John	Catalfamo	(@John_Catalfamo)	is	a	Masters	student	in	International	Political	Economy	at	the	LSE.
Laura	Arts	is	a	Masters	student	in	International	Affairs	in	the	joint	degree	programme	with	the	LSE	and	Peking
University.
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